Provenance
This standalone page was migrated from the February 2026 compendium corpus.
This matrix evaluates the United States, China, Japan, Europe (aggregated EU-27), and India across all five factors using a four-point scale: Strong (surplus/advantage), Moderate (adequate with vulnerabilities), Weak (significant deficiencies), Critical (existential dependency or failure).
Ratings are based on evidence from the 10 research reports, independent framework audit, and supplementary deep research.
Factor 1: Food Sufficiency
| Country | Rating | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| United States | Strong | Net food exporter across most categories. Second-largest fertilizer importer ($9.4B) but has domestic production capacity. Vulnerability: potash and nitrogen import dependence. Potash and phosphate added to 2025 USGS Critical Minerals List. US imports of Russian fertilizer up approximately 30% in 2025 despite sanctions. (Research 10) |
| China | Moderate | Largest food producer globally but massive import dependence for soybeans, corn, and other feed grains. Controls approximately 30% of global phosphate fertilizer production. Dominates urea production (approximately 29.5%). Vulnerability: food import routes transit Malacca Strait, creating a dual energy-food chokepoint. Internal demand creates tension between export revenue and domestic food security. (Research 10) |
| Japan | Critical | Food self-sufficiency rate approximately 38% (calorie basis), among the lowest in OECD. Heavily dependent on imported grain, protein, and feed. Maritime dependency through Malacca creates acute vulnerability. Labor shortages in agriculture compound structural weakness. (Research 04) |
| Europe | Moderate | EU-27 is a major agricultural producer (France, Germany, Poland are significant) but import-dependent for fertilizer inputs, feed grain, and tropical commodities. Southern European water stress is a growing constraint. EU agricultural policy (CAP) provides structural support but does not eliminate external dependency for key inputs. (Research 10) |
| India | Moderate | Major food producer (second globally in rice, wheat, fruits, vegetables) but third-largest fertilizer importer ($7.8B). Has diversified fertilizer suppliers, increasing reliance on Russia and the Middle East as China restricted urea exports. Vulnerability: monsoon variability and water stress. Large domestic agricultural employment base provides resilience but also constrains modernization. (Research 10) |
Factor 2: Energy Sufficiency
| Country | Rating | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| United States | Strong | Largest oil and gas producer globally. Net energy exporter since approximately 2019. Shale revolution provides structural energy independence. Vulnerability: refining capacity concentration in Gulf Coast (hurricane risk), and energy transition creates new dependencies on critical minerals for renewables and batteries. (Research 07, 08) |
| China | Weak | Imports approximately 72% of crude oil and 40%+ of natural gas. 77-80% of oil imports transit the Malacca Strait [VERIFIED]. Overland pipelines from Russia and Myanmar displace less than 15-18% of maritime energy flow. Gwadar-Kashgar pipeline does not exist [FALSE]. The “Malacca Dilemma” remains unresolved despite two decades of diversification. A total blockade would cause 7-10% GDP contraction in the first year. (Research 01) |
| Japan | Critical | Imports approximately 90% of energy needs. Heavily dependent on LNG imports via maritime chokepoints. Nuclear restart program partially addresses vulnerability but remains politically constrained. Energy dependence is the primary driver of Japan’s strategic alignment decisions and the channel’s thesis about forced repatriation. Labor shortage costs 2.6% of GDP annually, limiting domestic energy infrastructure buildout. (Research 01, 04) |
| Europe | Weak | EU-27 energy dependence approximately 55-60% of consumption is imported. Russian gas dependency violently restructured in 2022, replaced by LNG (US, Qatar, Norway) at higher cost. Renewable expansion is significant but intermittent. Nuclear capacity declining (Germany exit) though France maintains it. Southern European solar potential partially offsets northern vulnerability. (Research 08) |
| India | Weak | Imports approximately 85% of crude oil and approximately 50% of natural gas. Third-largest energy consumer globally. Has diversified suppliers (Russia increased to approximately 40% of oil imports post-2022 at discounted prices). Vulnerability: maritime routes through Indian Ocean are relatively secure but scale of import dependence creates structural fragility. Coal reserves provide domestic baseline but create climate policy tensions. |
Factor 3: Technology Capability
| Country | Rating | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| United States | Strong | Leads in design (Nvidia, Qualcomm, AMD, Apple), AI/ML, and cloud infrastructure. Semiconductor fabrication weakness being addressed through CHIPS Act ($30.9B across 40 projects). Intel 9.9% government equity stake. TSMC Arizona, Samsung Texas, Micron Idaho all building capacity. Critical weakness: REMM dependency — 85-91% of rare earth processing and 92-94% of magnet manufacturing in China. 10-20 year replication timeline [VERIFIED]. (Research 02, 03) |
| China | Strong | Dominates critical minerals processing (60-70% mining, 85-91% separation, 92-94% magnets, 98% gallium, approximately 99% heavy REE processing). Leading in 5G deployment, EV manufacturing, battery production, and solar panel manufacturing. Weakness: dependent on ASML EUV lithography for advanced nodes; unable to produce sub-7nm chips domestically. The ban on rare earth processing technology exports (Dec 2023) demonstrates strategic leverage. STEM graduate pipeline vastly exceeds Western nations. (Research 02, 09) |
| Japan | Moderate | Retains critical positions in semiconductor materials (photoresists, specialty gases, silicon wafers), advanced packaging, and precision equipment. TDK and Shin-Etsu are major magnet and specialty material producers. Rapidus ($11.6B+ government investment) targets 2nm production by 2027 but execution is uncertain. GPIF and METI driving strategic technology investment. Weakness: lost leadership in advanced logic fabrication, dependent on TSMC for leading-edge nodes. (Research 03, 04) |
| Europe | Moderate | ASML’s EUV monopoly is the single most critical process-level technology chokepoint globally. STMicroelectronics, Infineon, and NXP maintain positions in automotive and industrial semiconductors. EU IPCEI committed 8.1B euros in semiconductor public funding. Weaknesses: no leading-edge logic fabrication capacity, dependent on external foundries. Intel Magdeburg fab paused/restructured. Limited position in AI/cloud infrastructure. (Research 03) |
| India | Weak | Emerging semiconductor design capability but no significant fabrication capacity. Modi government has announced incentives for fab construction (Tata-PSMC partnership) but facilities are years from production. Strength in IT services and software development. Weakness: heavily dependent on imports for all advanced technology hardware. Rare earth deposits exist but processing infrastructure is minimal. The “India semiconductor dream” is aspirational, not operational. |
Factor 4: Demographics
| Country | Rating | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| United States | Moderate | The only major advanced economy with near-replacement fertility (approximately 1.6-1.7) and positive population growth through immigration. Working-age population relatively stable. Weakness: political constraints on immigration, skills mismatch in manufacturing workforce, STEM pipeline concerns relative to China. (Research 04, 08) |
| China | Weak | Population peaked in 2022 and is in structural decline. Working-age population shrinking faster than Japan’s did at the same stage. Fertility rate approximately 1.0 (one of the lowest globally). Massive STEM pipeline but aging workforce constrains industrial expansion. Internal migration from rural to urban partially buffers but is decelerating. The demographic transition from asset to liability is underway. (Research 04) |
| Japan | Critical | Most advanced demographic crisis among major economies. Population declining by approximately 500,000 per year. Labor shortage costs 2.6% of GDP [VERIFIED]. Corporate bankruptcies from labor shortages rose 32% in 2024. Immigration culturally constrained. The demographic crisis is the primary driver of Japan’s fiscal expansion, strategic spending, and the channel’s “crisis management investing” thesis. (Research 04) |
| Europe | Weak | Germany: working-age decline of 4-6 million by 2035, 5 million skilled worker shortage by 2030. Italy: 21% working-age shrinkage projected by 2040 without migration. Spain: needs cumulative 24 million migrant workers by 2053 to stabilize pensions. France relatively resilient (fertility approximately 1.8). Immigration politically contested across the continent. Southern and Eastern Europe aging faster than North and West. (Research 04) |
| India | Strong | Youngest major economy with median age approximately 28. Working-age population still growing and will peak in the 2040s-2050s. Massive labor force availability. Weakness: quality of workforce (education, skills training, health) does not match quantity. Significant underemployment. The “demographic dividend” is real but requires institutional and educational investment to capture. |
Factor 5: Security (“Are We Easy to Attack?“)
| Country | Rating | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| United States | Strong | Two-ocean geography provides natural insulation. Largest military budget ($800B+). Nuclear deterrent. 750-877 foreign military bases [MISLEADING — depends on definition]. 2025 NSS codifies hemisphere-first posture (“Trump Corollary”). Vulnerability: overextension risk, alliance fatigue, domestic political constraints on force projection. Panama Canal and Greenland actions demonstrate active hemispheric consolidation. (Research 07) |
| China | Moderate | Large military with nuclear deterrent. Significant land borders with potential adversaries (India, Vietnam, Russia long-term). Maritime vulnerability through Malacca Strait is existential — 77-80% of oil imports transit this chokepoint. Taiwan proximity creates the most consequential potential flashpoint. South China Sea island militarization partially addresses but does not resolve fundamental maritime exposure. (Research 01, 09) |
| Japan | Weak | Island geography provides some insulation but limited strategic depth. Dependent on US security guarantee, which is under strain from burden-shifting. Proximity to China, North Korea, and Russia creates multiple threat vectors. Defense spending increasing (approximately 2% GDP target) but starting from a low base. New Joint Operations Command signals institutional modernization. Nuclear energy restart addresses energy-security overlap. (Research 04, 07) |
| Europe | Weak | Fragmented defense across 27 member states with no unified command. NATO provides framework but burden-sharing disputes undermine credibility. Russia threat on eastern border is active and enduring. Poland (4.8% GDP defense spending) is emerging as the eastern flank anchor. EU pursuing a 100,000-troop rapid reaction force [UNVERIFIED] and common satellite infrastructure, but institutional reform is slow. Energy infrastructure (pipelines, LNG terminals) creates additional attack surface. (Research 07, 08) |
| India | Moderate | Nuclear deterrent. Large military. Strategic geography controlling Indian Ocean maritime routes. Vulnerability: contested land borders with China (Ladakh) and Pakistan. Limited power projection capability beyond the subcontinent. Non-aligned posture (“multi-alignment”) provides diplomatic flexibility but limits deep alliance integration. Defense industrial base is modernizing but still import-dependent for advanced platforms. |
Summary Matrix
| Factor | US | China | Japan | Europe | India |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Food | Strong | Moderate | Critical | Moderate | Moderate |
| Energy | Strong | Weak | Critical | Weak | Weak |
| Technology | Strong | Strong | Moderate | Moderate | Weak |
| Demographics | Moderate | Weak | Critical | Weak | Strong |
| Security | Strong | Moderate | Weak | Weak | Moderate |
| Overall | Strong | Mixed | Weak | Weak | Mixed |
Key Insight: The United States is the only country that rates Strong in three or more factors, which validates the channel’s core claim about US structural advantage in a deglobalized world. However, the US REMM dependency (embedded in Technology) is the single most binding constraint on its otherwise dominant position. China’s strength in Technology (specifically processing and materials) is the mirror image — its greatest leverage comes precisely where the US is weakest. Japan and Europe share similar profiles: technologically capable but demographically declining and energy-dependent, which explains why the channel predicts they will be forced into strategic alignment decisions. India’s Strong demographics rating is its primary differentiator, but converting demographic potential into industrial and technological capability requires institutional development that is not yet assured.