Provenance
This standalone page was migrated from the February 2026 compendium corpus.
All 43 videos from the allthingsfinancial channel, ordered chronologically by date parsed from titles. Two videos (zn_5lFf4QqA, soWHOoC_jLc) lacked explicit title dates and are placed by context as late October 2025. One title (sHXPWsU2cGA) had malformed date “1-252026” normalized to 2026-01-25.
| # | Date | Video ID | Title (abbreviated) | Key New Insight | Framework Refinement |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2025-05-31 | RFxfIv3sz1w | Markets are a device for transferring money from the impatient to the patient | Early macro setup: duration stress, Japan yields, inflation/tariff pressure, 15-year transition language | Introduced cross-asset lens and long-horizon framing for Five Factors |
| 2 | 2025-06-10 | Z3Fr35B0e9g | TINA: The dollar in a box with no way out | TINA/dollar analysis with reserve-currency alternatives constrained by Five Factors | Connected Five Factors to currency hierarchy and treasury yield demand |
| 3 | 2025-06-16 | eQsZZH_sWmo | The Fed, Fed Balance Sheet, Global Systems and can we do QE | Explicit “global systems breaking” argument (food/energy/tech/UCI), QE limits, fertilizer vulnerability | Added systems-break model and commodity-first investment orientation. Contains [FALSE] Iran urea claim (52-54%) |
| 4 | 2025-06-18 | wpi_6P9SDQM | The Five Factors: Energy, The Malacca Dilemma, Israel, Iran, Renminbi | Energy deep-dive: Malacca dilemma, China-Iran structure, Gwadar logistics, RMB settlement | Established chokepoint geopolitics as central energy-security mechanic. Contains [FALSE] Gwadar pipeline claim |
| 5 | 2025-07-02 | LtmIpDU6OAQ | A beginning is a delicate time… Trading versus Investing | Trading vs investing distinction; REMM positioned as multi-year structural break | Formalized time-horizon rule (months = trade; 5-20 years = investment) |
| 6 | 2025-07-06 | WW1dADURPM4 | Clarity over certainty: CEO decisions for a world in 15 years | ”Clarity over certainty” for CEOs; Apple supply-chain concentration in China | Brought corporate strategy into Five Factors decision framework |
| 7 | 2025-07-09 | yTU6Yk63MMA | Stanford Innovation Lab interview: A new narrative - funding de-globalization | Deglobalization financing stress, tax narrative, sovereign revenue pressure | Added fiscal funding problem as implementation constraint |
| 8 | 2025-07-10 | dxP__XWqCpo | Secure and Control: The Five Factors breaking global systems | Canonical Five Factors statement; US Steel/MP/Intel case studies; state-ownership thesis | Major synthesis point linking geopolitics directly to investable names |
| 9 | 2025-07-12 | M8OkLAIHD9Y | Five Factors: The Eagle - Rising Sun - The Dragon Part 1 | Japan-China-US comparison under Five Factors; alliance-choice logic | Applied framework comparatively across major powers |
| 10 | 2025-07-13 | eGrZxGDe9Eg | The Eagle and the setting Sun: politics is the reconciliation of conflicting interests | Japan debt/currency contradiction under U.S. demands; yen carry systemic risk | Added plumbing-risk channel from policy conflict to global markets |
| 11 | 2025-07-14 | DevajHP2DfQ | One of the great mistakes is to judge a policy by its intention rather than results | Japan long-bond yield as competitor signal to U.S. assets | Strengthened bond/yield transmission mechanism in framework |
| 12 | 2025-07-28 | AuUzNuWHA08 | From bipolar to multipolar flexibility: Europe, Russia, China | Europe/Russia/China long-horizon realignment thesis via Five Factors | Extended framework to 2040 geopolitical bloc forecasting |
| 13 | 2025-08-03 | XGfjgpYLJlM | Update: Domino Thoughts on Russian and US Empires, MADD Malacca | Empire pullback framing; MADD/chokepoint logic; North American factor advantage | Shifted from country snapshots to bloc-level survivability comparisons |
| 14 | 2025-08-15 | cstXgj-SCqs | The Five Factors to invest in the new world: MP Materials-Intel-Drones | Intel government stake thesis reaffirmed; MP and drones as sequence | Converted framework into explicit public-market playbook |
| 15 | 2025-09-07 | PtA9gIRQ8d4 | Plans of the diligent lead to abundance but he who is hasty comes to want | China 2025 and Europe response; industrial-policy competitiveness comparison | Positioned Five Factors as global policy-convergence benchmark |
| 16 | 2025-09-10 | bJlaDSNWq44 | Amateurs talk strategy; professionals talk logistics | Logistics/military projection; gallium dependency and decoupling cost scale | Deepened critical-minerals security layer beyond REMM headline. Contains [MISLEADING] 2T cost claim |
| 17 | 2025-09-18 | Qrp0do7eAIY | The Five Factors and Intel, Nvidia, Russia, China, Poland | Intel/Nvidia dependency, Poland route shock, petrodollar-era stress | Reinforced “secure-control” as operative policy verb across regions |
| 18 | 2025-09-19 | Q5e20a3ICt4 | Data, information, personal experience, opinion, misinformation | Methodology video: data hierarchy, multi-narrative process, long-cycle signal filters | Provided explicit analytical operating system behind framework |
| 19 | 2025-10-01 | AWfTxiEFzxo | Black Wednesday redux: Argentina uses US dollars to paper over bad policies | Argentina support/FX plumbing case, conditionality critique, five-factor market lens | Added sovereign-FX intervention risk example outside core REMM theme |
| 20 | 2025-10-11 | tWY_x5G-sVs | Rare Earth Minerals - The Five Factors - Options for the US | REMM shock escalation: documentation regime, U.S. leverage limits, 10-20 year rebuild cost | Cemented rare-earth dependency as top U.S. strategic bottleneck |
| 21 | 2025-10-16 | c39gSUCiQSw | The Polar Silk Road and the Istanbul Bridge: Geo-politics and the new Belt Road | Polar Silk Road, East Russia resource thesis, route/time-cost differentials | Expanded chokepoint mapping to Arctic logistics and territorial strategy |
| 22 | ~2025-10 | zn_5lFf4QqA | Intel and government investments according to the Five Factors Part 1 | Qualcomm-Intel takeover discussion; foundry economics and CHIPS Act rationale | Began undated Intel miniseries around sovereignty vs M&A dynamics |
| 23 | ~2025-10 | soWHOoC_jLc | Intel and government investments according to the Five Factors Part 2 | Intel “too big to fail” and consortium governance logic | Clarified preferred ownership architecture for strategic tech node |
| 24 | 2025-11-07 | z59DbftccgU | Five Factors & crisis management investing in Japan | Japan crisis-management investing ($65B), sovereign fund concept, yen carry watchpoints | Operationalized Five Factors through national budget architecture |
| 25 | 2025-11-16 | E8TW2rmrLvI | He who solves a problem with a problem will always have problem waiting: Japan stimulus | Japan package expansion (~$110B), labor/demographic strain, policy trade-offs | Strengthened thesis that high-debt states still must spend strategically |
| 26 | 2025-11-23 | Ykr4jh0Qebs | Intel is the vertical hub spokes for the US tech domestic industry: Nexperia | Nexperia packaging disruption and Intel hub-and-spokes framing | Added packaging layer to semiconductor sovereignty model |
| 27 | 2025-11-28 | a9rK6-ZfOiM | Rising debt implies higher financing needs by sovereigns crowding out corporate debt | Sovereign debt crowding out, credit spread pressure, strategic spending dilemma | Integrated corporate-financing consequences into Five Factors world |
| 28 | 2025-12-02 | DKEwlA5wahg | Investing in Critical Manufacturing Sovereignty by counter investing | ”Critical manufacturing sovereignty” naming and counter-investing framework | Rebranded thesis into repeatable portfolio-construction language |
| 29 | 2025-12-08 | 1oB-fDyh7JI | A strategic withdrawal is running away but with dignity: From global to regional | U.S. strategic withdrawal/regionalization narrative and base-footprint rethink | Elevated sphere-of-influence logic as security-economics driver. Contains [MISLEADING] 845 bases claim |
| 30 | 2025-12-11 | zdT2Z95lDJY | The Fed with yesterday’s cut moves the Fed into managing our debt’s interest rates | Fed mandate-shift claim toward debt-service management; short-end purchases emphasis | Linked domestic monetary regime change to Five Factors capital regime |
| 31 | 2025-12-17 | 4wkLrwcFpwc | The Europeans - EU - EURO - NATO are in flux | EU/EURO/NATO flux under economic negotiation pressure | Reinforced political-to-economic regime transition thesis in Europe |
| 32 | 2025-12-21 | rD-D9pYHhdE | The Europe Russia China narrative: new data points show a new future | New Europe-Russia-China datapoints; United States of Europe discourse | Updated long-run bloc realignment scenario with contemporary signals |
| 33 | 2026-01-05 | ppKGScUyWPs | EUROYEN: Clarity is parsing distortions from structural shifts | EUROYEN positioning under “clarity over certainty” | Refined currency allocation logic as policy-clarity function |
| 34 | 2026-01-06 | -oL19UtqQZ8 | Venezuela and the Five Factors: America accelerated securing and controlling resources | Venezuela/hemisphere acceleration thesis; transactional alliances | Applied Five Factors to U.S. regional power-consolidation narrative |
| 35 | 2026-01-12 | vXqw2FDHcCk | An inherent trait of a Balkanized society is that the parts fight each other not the enemy | Balkanization critique; EU defense capacity and institutional redesign signs | Showed security factor driving institutional restructuring |
| 36 | 2026-01-15 | ITWkeSbjzq0 | The US prepares to meet Xi by trying to align allies in a REM strategy | U.S. REM strategy before Xi meeting; refining vs mining gap; bilateral deal push | Moved framework into active policy-negotiation timeline |
| 37 | 2026-01-25 | sHXPWsU2cGA | The crowd is not always wrong but the best trades usually start by looking wrong | Yen carry mechanics clarification; institutional-flow interpretation | Improved market plumbing layer and reduced simplistic FX narratives |
| 38 | 2026-01-28 | M8o5xUJxP7M | The Five Factors - Critical Manufacturing Sovereignty - Pension Fund Capital | Pension-capital repatriation and mandated domestic strategic investment | Major capital-flow extension of Five Factors into asset allocation |
| 39 | 2026-02-04 | QZ1lUyRaFuQ | COMEX circuit breakers versus market chaos: Japan insurers & JGBs | COMEX stress + Japanese insurer/JGB impairment risk monitoring | Added financial-stability chokepoints to sovereign strategy map |
| 40 | 2026-02-05 | f8t04CuUBxw | The countries’ coffers become the kingdom’s forge: Capital pools co-opted for investing | Sovereign wealth fund/pension pool co-option thesis across countries | Codified “capital pools become policy tools” as structural regime change |
| 41 | 2026-02-08 | phEqWBdmIEk | Supermajorities enable sweeping economic changes without compromise with risk | Japan supermajority and faster policy execution risk/reward | Added political execution-speed variable to economic thesis |
| 42 | 2026-02-23 | jJjb74N_oj4 | Taoguang yanghui yousuo zuowei: China’s strategy on REM vs US Strategy | U.S. internal split on China strategy; REMM dependence vs security hawks | Highlighted policy bifurcation risk within Five Factors implementation |
| 43 | 2026-02-24 | 6EnHyDKOm-k | The Five Factors chokepoints are pervasive problems but investment opportunities | Chokepoints broadened to process-level monopolies (materials/memory/turbines) | Final maturation: from macro factors to granular supply-stack investing |
Framework Evolution Summary
The 43 videos span nine months (May 2025 - February 2026) and show a clear four-phase evolution:
Phase 1: Foundation (Videos 1-8, May-July 2025) Establishes the five-factor country scoring model, introduces the “systems breaking” thesis, names specific chokepoints (Malacca, REMM), and connects geopolitics to investable positions. Video 8 (dxP__XWqCpo) is the canonical synthesis point.
Phase 2: Comparative Application (Videos 9-21, July-October 2025) Applies the framework across countries (Japan, China, Europe), deepens the REMM thesis, adds logistics and military dimensions, and introduces the methodology video explaining the analytical process. The framework shifts from single-country analysis to bloc-level comparisons.
Phase 3: Capital Architecture (Videos 22-32, October-December 2025) Adds Intel consortium model, sovereign debt crowding-out dynamics, the “critical manufacturing sovereignty” rebrand, US strategic retrenchment thesis, and Fed mandate-shift claims. The framework evolves from identifying chokepoints to modeling the capital flows that address them.
Phase 4: State Capital & Process Monopolies (Videos 33-43, January-February 2026) Introduces pension capital repatriation, COMEX plumbing stress, sovereign wealth fund co-option, and the final evolution toward process-level monopoly identification. The framework reaches its mature state: from macro factors to granular supply-stack investing with state capital as the transmission mechanism.