Provenance
This standalone page was migrated from the February 2026 compendium corpus.
Material chokepoints exist where the extraction, processing, or refinement of a critical input is concentrated in one or two countries to a degree that creates systemic dependency. Unlike geographic chokepoints, which can theoretically be bypassed (at cost), material chokepoints often have no near-term substitute: the physics or chemistry of the material dictates the application, and building alternative supply takes years to decades.
Rare Earth Elements (REE/REMM)
Rare earth elements are the channel’s single most discussed material chokepoint, forming the backbone of the “critical manufacturing sovereignty” thesis from the July 2025 canonical statement through the final February 2026 videos.
The supply chain concentration data is [VERIFIED] and, if anything, understated by the channel:
| Supply Chain Stage | China’s Global Share | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Mining (Extraction) | 60-70% | Down from ~90% a decade ago; MP Materials (US) and Lynas (Australia) have partially closed the gap |
| Separation & Processing | 85-91% | The critical bottleneck. Even ore mined outside China is often shipped to China for separation |
| Magnet Manufacturing | 92-94% | China exports ~58,000 tonnes of NdFeB magnets annually |
| Heavy REE Processing (Dy/Tb) | ~99% | Near-absolute monopoly on the elements needed for high-temperature military magnets |
The channel frequently cites a figure of “2 trillion” as the cost of replicating the REE supply chain outside China. This is [MISLEADING]. The direct capital expenditure required for mine-to-magnet independence projects is in the range of 600 billion-to-$2 trillion range refers to economic disruption costs — the GDP impact of a sudden Chinese export ban across all affected industries, or the broader cumulative cost of U.S.-China decoupling estimated by think tanks. Using this figure to size the investment opportunity in REE companies is a category error. The actual investment needed is well within government willingness to spend, which is precisely why the policy support thesis (MP Materials, USA Rare Earth) is credible.
The channel’s 10-20 year timeline for full supply chain independence is [VERIFIED] across multiple independent assessments, including Goldman Sachs and CSIS estimates. Developing a rare earth mine takes approximately 10 or more years from discovery to production. Building a refinery takes 5 or more years. The U.S. lost its technical expertise and intellectual property in this sector during the 1990s and 2000s (notably the Magnequench transfer to China in 1995-2002), and re-establishing a mine-to-magnet ecosystem is genuinely a multi-decade effort.
What the channel misses: China as consumer, not just supplier. The framework treats China almost exclusively as a supply controller. But China is also the world’s largest consumer of rare earths — its domestic EV industry, wind turbine manufacturing, and electronics sectors absorb the majority of its own production. This creates a dynamic the channel largely ignores: China’s internal demand growth may constrain its willingness to weaponize exports, because restricting supply raises prices for its own manufacturers. The December 2023 ban on processing technology exports and the 2024-2025 targeted bans on gallium/germanium exports to the U.S. suggest Beijing has solved this by restricting technology transfer and targeted end-users rather than imposing blanket export bans that would hurt its domestic industry. This is a more sophisticated strategy than the channel’s framing implies.
Gallium
The channel claims China controls 98% of global gallium production.
This is [VERIFIED]. USGS and CSIS data confirm China produces approximately 98% of the world’s low-purity gallium, primarily as a byproduct of its massive aluminum industry. Gallium nitride (GaN) semiconductors are essential for the most advanced U.S. military systems: AESA radars (AN/SPY-6 on Navy destroyers, AN/TPY-2 missile defense), the F-35 radar, and next-generation electronic warfare systems. The U.S. is 100% import-dependent for primary gallium.
China’s escalation path has been systematic: licensing requirements in August 2023 (prices spiked 40%), escalation to effective bans on U.S. exports in late 2024/early 2025 (prices in Europe surged over 360%), and the introduction of extraterritorial jurisdiction rules in late 2025 modeled on the U.S. Foreign Direct Product Rule. This means a magnet manufactured in Japan using Chinese-origin gallium could theoretically be subject to Chinese export controls if sold to the U.S.
However, the 98% figure has a decay trajectory. Nyrstar (Belgium/Tennessee) has proposed a $150 million facility to recover gallium from zinc residues, potentially meeting 80% of U.S. demand. Metlen (Greece) is piloting bauxite-derived gallium extraction. Rio Tinto and other aluminum producers could develop gallium recovery as a byproduct. The current monopoly is likely to erode over 3-5 years as diversification projects mature, though none are yet operational at commercial scale.
Fertilizer Chains
The channel claims Iran controls 52-54% of global urea production.
This is [FALSE]. Iran produces approximately 18-20 million tonnes of urea annually, representing roughly 8-10% of global production (~200 million tonnes). The dominant producers are China (~30% of global urea), India (~13%), and Russia/Belarus (~21% of global fertilizer supply broadly). The 52-54% figure is not corroborated by USGS, FAO, or IFA data and may refer to a sub-regional market share (Middle Eastern urea exports) or a different commodity entirely.
The channel’s broader point about fertilizer as a strategic chokepoint is valid, even if the specific numbers are wrong. Russia and Belarus together account for approximately 21% of global fertilizer exports (potash, nitrogen, phosphate combined). China’s periodic export restrictions on urea have disrupted global agricultural input markets. The U.S. actually increased imports of Russian fertilizer by approximately 30% in 2025, demonstrating that sanctions regimes create perverse dependencies rather than clean breaks.
A significant omission in the channel’s analysis is Morocco’s OCP Group. Morocco holds approximately 75% of the world’s known phosphate reserves. OCP is the world’s largest phosphate exporter and one of the largest fertilizer producers. This makes Morocco a structural chokepoint that does not appear in any of the 43 transcripts. Phosphate is non-substitutable in agriculture — there is no synthetic alternative. Morocco’s geopolitical alignment (broadly Western, but with independent regional interests) and its monopoly position make it a chokepoint comparable in structural importance to Chinese rare earths, though the political risk profile is different.
Copper: The Emerging Chokepoint
The channel mentions copper as an emerging material chokepoint in late-period videos, but without the depth given to rare earths or gallium. This is an underdeveloped area of the framework. Global copper demand is projected to increase 50-70% by 2040 driven by electrification (EVs, grid infrastructure, data centers). Chile and Peru together produce approximately 40% of global mined copper. The Democratic Republic of Congo is the fastest-growing producer. Processing is concentrated in China (~40% of global smelting/refining capacity).
Unlike rare earths, copper has many producers and the bottleneck is less about monopoly than about aggregate supply insufficiency relative to demand growth. This makes it a different type of chokepoint — one driven by structural deficit rather than political concentration — but the investment implications overlap: upstream producers and processing infrastructure benefit from a multi-year supply-demand imbalance.