Provenance
This standalone page was migrated from the February 2026 compendium corpus.
What is predicted: Governments across advanced economies will increasingly mandate or strongly incentivize the redirection of pension capital, sovereign wealth funds, and institutional savings pools toward domestic strategic industries. The channel frames this as a structural regime change — not a cyclical policy preference — driven by the collision of sovereign debt pressure, deglobalization urgency, and the inadequacy of private-sector ROI in strategic sectors.
Evidence supporting: The policy trend is documented across multiple jurisdictions and accelerating. The UK Mansion House Compact (2023) and its expanded Accord (2025) target 5% of DC pension defaults for UK private markets, estimated at 30-50 billion pounds at full implementation. Canada is pressuring its “Maple 8” pension funds to invest domestically, with aspirational targets of 1.7 trillion AUM) made its first independent domestic alternative fund selection in September 2025, allocating 50 billion yen. The EU faces 300 billion euros in annual capital outflows to US markets and is pursuing a Savings and Investment Union to retain savings. Australia’s Future Made in Australia Act committed A$22.7 billion over a decade. Belgium’s SFPIM operates as an explicit strategic autonomy fund. Gulf SWFs are linking capital deployment to industrial diversification. The channel correctly identified this convergence before several policies were formalized, which is a genuine analytical credit.
Evidence against: The gap between policy announcement and capital deployment is enormous. UK pension allocations to unlisted equities grew from 0.36% to only 0.6% against a 5% target — representing less than 12% of the way there after two years. Japan’s NISA program is generating massive retail outflows into foreign equities (25 trillion Japanese assets” figure is [FALSE], which undermines credibility on the magnitude claims specific to Japan.
Falsification criteria: (1) UK pension providers fail to reach even half the 5% UK allocation target by 2028. (2) Canadian pension funds successfully resist political pressure using fiduciary duty arguments. (3) Japanese retail capital continues accelerating outflows despite policy pressure through 2027. (4) A major pension fund suffers visible losses on mandated domestic investments, triggering political reversal in any of the four primary jurisdictions. (5) More broadly: if by 2030, the aggregate capital redeployed across all major programs remains below 400-800 billion), the “wave” characterization is overstated.
Timeline and testability: The first meaningful data points arrive in 2027-2028 (UK Mansion House compliance rates, GPIF allocation changes, Canadian domestic percentages). Full assessment requires a 5-7 year window. The prediction is testable but slow-moving.
Current assessment: Mixed signals. The directional trend is real and documented. The magnitude and speed claims are unsubstantiated by actual flows. The Japan-specific claims contain factual errors that weaken confidence. Direction: on track. Magnitude: too early to assess.