Provenance
This standalone page was migrated from the February 2026 compendium corpus.
What is predicted: The next phase of geopolitical-economic competition will move beyond geographic chokepoints (Malacca, Hormuz, rail corridors) to hidden process-level monopolies inside production stacks. Companies with 90%+ market share in a single critical material or process step with no near substitute will become the new strategic chokepoints. The channel names semiconductor packaging (ASE 44.6%, Amkor 15.2%, JCET 12%), specialty materials (Nitto Denko), and advanced tooling (ASML EUV) as examples.
Evidence supporting: The concept is validated by observable events. The Nexperia/Newport Wafer Fab divestiture case demonstrated that governments now treat even legacy packaging facilities as sovereignty assets, with the US pressuring the UK to force divestiture under national security laws. China’s export controls have moved from raw materials (rare earth ores) to processing technologies (December 2023 ban on rare earth processing technology exports) and intermediate materials (gallium, germanium) — a textbook progression from geographic to process-level control. ASML’s EUV lithography monopoly is already the subject of US-led export controls. Advanced packaging concentration (China holds approximately 30% of advanced packaging specifically) is increasingly recognized as a bottleneck distinct from wafer fabrication. CFIUS and equivalent bodies are expanding scope to cover more mid-stack companies, confirming the policy trend. The semiconductor research confirms these concentration patterns are real and structurally durable.
Evidence against: The thesis is strong conceptually but operationally underdeveloped. The channel provides no systematic screening methodology for identifying process-stack monopolies beyond a few named examples. Many process monopolies are subsidiaries of larger conglomerates, Japanese private companies, or state-owned enterprises — not easily accessible to public market investors. Monopoly positions may be more fragile than the framework suggests: material science advances can create substitutes (ASML’s own EUV disrupted prior lithography monopolies), and government intervention can force technology sharing or licensing. The “no substitute” claim requires continuous verification — it is a snapshot, not a permanent condition. The prediction conflates two distinct phenomena: (1) identification of existing process monopolies (a description) and (2) proliferation of new ones (a forecast). The former is valuable; the latter is speculative.
Falsification criteria: (1) A major process monopoly loses share to a new entrant within 3-5 years, proving substitutability. (2) Governments mandate open licensing of critical process technologies, destroying pricing power. (3) The companies identified turn out to have low margins despite high market share, suggesting commodity-like economics despite monopoly position. (4) Process concentration in key sectors decreases over the next decade due to government-funded diversification programs.
Timeline and testability: The long-horizon framing (5-20 years) is appropriate. Near-term signals include M&A activity in semiconductor materials/packaging, CFIUS scope expansion, and CHIPS Act funding beyond fabrication.
Current assessment: On track as a descriptive observation. As a predictive claim about proliferation, it is too early to assess. This is the framework’s most intellectually original contribution and the one most likely to generate non-consensus investment insights.