Quantitative Baseline
- Display score: 3/5
- Continuous score: 49.3
- Confidence: VERIFIED
- Data year: 2023
- Sources: FAO Food Balance Sheets, FAO Food Balance Sheets (derived), FAOSTAT Fertilizers by Nutrient, WRI Aqueduct
| Metric | Tier | Raw | Normalized | Source | Year |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Caloric self-sufficiency | DOMINANT | 0.67 | 38.3 | FAO Food Balance Sheets (derived) | 2023 |
| Cereal import dependency | PRIMARY | 0.24 | 76.4 | FAO Food Balance Sheets | 2023 |
| Water stress | PRIMARY | 1.30 | 74.0 | WRI Aqueduct | 2023 |
| Fertilizer import dependency | SUPPLEMENTARY | 0.88 | 11.5 | FAOSTAT Fertilizers by Nutrient | 2023 |
Assessment
Britain can feed itself politically longer than it can feed itself autarkically. Its dependence is manageable in normal conditions but leaves the country exposed to broad energy and logistics disruptions.
This is not a famine story. Britain is a wealthy importer with strong logistics and deep liquidity. But the system is optimized for open trade, not deep redundancy, so simultaneous shocks to fuel and fertilizer inputs would quickly turn food resilience into a macroeconomic stress problem.
Strategic Read
- The profile is that of a rich trading state that is stable while the trade system works.
- Fertilizer dependence is the hidden weak link, especially where energy price volatility is high.
- Food security is rarely a first-order failure mode; it becomes significant when multiple systems fail at once.
Qualitative Overlay Notes
- The score may understate institutional resilience and finance, which help absorb temporary disruptions.
- It may understate concentration risk across supply routes and external inputs.
- In the system-wide view, food is a downstream pressure amplifier rather than the core driver.
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